Report: Hegseth violated multiple protocols and federal law in 'Signalgate'

Though Hegseth as war secretary does have the authority to determine the classification level of any information he shares (how sensitive the information is), the report affirmed, the methods of communication are a separate matter governed by federal cybersecurity, recordkeeping and communications rules.

In March, Hegseth sent a “team update” to a Signal group chat with 18 other government officials, listing the planned times and assets to be used in strikes against the Yemeni Houthi rebel group later that day.

F-18s would launch at 12:15 Eastern time, and their first strike window would start at 1:45 PM. 

“Target Terrorist is @ his Known Location so SHOULD BE ON TIME,” Hegseth noted. 

He went on to include launch and strike times for the second group of F-18s, when the first bombs would “definitely drop” and when sea-based Tomahawks would be launched.

Hegseth has described this information as an “unclassified summary” of “non-specific, general details” that wouldn’t endanger anyone or anything on their own.

“There was nothing classified in this text. There were no locations or targets identified. There were no details that would endanger our troops or the mission. The details which were included would be useless without also knowing the undisclosed details,” Hegseth wrote in a statement to the office in July.

But the office disagreed, instead describing the texted information as “sensitive, nonpublic, operational information” that the War Department prohibits from being sent on a personal device or an unapproved messaging app like Signal, even though it is encrypted.

The office also determined that the Houthis could have acted preemptively based on the information in the messaging thread.

“If this information had fallen into the hands of U.S. adversaries, Houthi forces might have been able to counter U.S. forces or reposition personnel and assets to avoid planned U.S. strikes,” the report reads. “Even though these events did not ultimately occur, the Secretary’s actions created a risk to operational security that could have resulted in failed U.S. mission objectives and potential harm to U.S. pilots.”

Despite its conclusions, the office did not make recommendations about the use of commercially available messaging apps like Signal in its report because the event was “only one instance of a larger, DoD-wide issue.” Instead, it recommended in another report that “the DoD improve training for senior DoD officials on the proper use of electronic devices.”